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The global capitalist economy is experiencing its worst crisis since the 1929 Great 
Depression.  Initially dismissed as mostly a routine financial turbulence in the summer 
months of 2007, the crisis conditions accelerated slowly, yet secularly, to reach an officially 
declared full-fledged recession in US and UK by the last quarter of 2008.  Over the course of 
2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to revise its growth projections for the 
world for the upcoming year three times, down from a celebrated 4.4% initially, to 2.4% in 
November, and then to a mere 0.5% in late January of 2009.  Many international financial 
institutions (IFIs) followed the suit.  Considering the well-accepted notion that for the world 
economy a rate of growth below 2.5% is taken by many economists as the threshold for 
“global recession”, the grim reality behind these numbers becomes clear.   
The global crisis is expected to take a heavy toll on the laboring masses and those heavily 
indebted and foreign finance-dependent economies.  The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) warned in early 2009 that the openly unemployed will increase by as much as 50 
million individuals by 2010, bringing total unemployed to 230 million, or to 7.1% of the 
global labor force. 
What is more revealing in our conjuncture is that the current crisis had not been initiated in 
the so-called emerging markets of the global periphery, but erupted directly in the hegemonic 
centers of the capitalist world.  What lie at the root of the crisis is not the usual common 
accusations of “corrupt” governments of crony capitalism, with their over-interference to the 
market rationality, but the upfront irrational exuberance of the “free” markets, with their 
unfettered workings guided by the private profit motive. 
Thus, by whatever means the current crisis episode will dwindle into a new kind of austerity, 
one lesson remains clear: it is no longer possible for the global capital to return to the patterns 
of trade and finance constructed in the post-1980 era.  The world economy has exhausted the 
fantasy tales of “free” trade, “liberalized” finance, and “flexible” labor markets where the 
motive for private profit seeking was taken as the unabated single rule for efficient allocation 
of resources leading to high incomes, human rights, civilization, prosperity, and so on.  The 
post-1980 phase of capitalism, which is often characterized as neoliberal globalization, was 
identified by a wide-encompassing restructuring of both the economic realm consolidating 
the realm of the markets, and the political aspects of this realm —the states.   
What lied at the heart of this restructuring was the ascendancy of finance over industry, a 
global process of financialization subjecting its logic of short-termism, liquidity, flexibility, 
and immense mobility over objectives of long term industrialization, sustainable development 
and poverty alleviation with social welfare driven states. Financialization, as it stands, is a 
loose term and no consensus yet exists among economists on its definition.  However, 
starting from David Harvey’s seminal observation that “something significant has changed in 
the way capitalism has been working since about 1970” (Harvey, 1989: 192), a set of 
distinguishing characteristics of the concept can be unveiled. Krippner (2005:174), in line 
with Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century defines it as a pattern of accumulation in which 
profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production.  According to Epstein (2005:3) “financialization means the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of domestic and international economies”. In what follows, in a broader way, we 
can consider financialization as a phenomenon which can be described by increasing 
financial motives, volume and impact of financial activities within and among countries.  As 3 
 
Duménil and Lévy (2004a) underline, “what is at issue here, are not markets and states per 
se, but the stricter subjection of these institutions to capital: on the one hand, the freedom of 
capital to act along its own interests with little consideration for salaried workers and the 
large masses of the world population, and, on the other hand, a state dedicated to the 
enforcement of this new social order and the confrontation to other states.”   
To these broad contours of capitalist expansion we will add two hypotheses in order to 
formulate a coherent analysis of the current global debacle: (i) crises, often followed by 
periods of wild expansion and euphoria are part of the anarchic characteristics of capitalist 
mode of production, whereby capital, historically speaking, has not hesitated to impose costly 
transformations often culminating in, what Rosa Luxembourg termed as, corrective wars; and 
(ii) since the main mover of capital is its quest for profit, it is of paramount importance that 
we understand the actual path of the profit rate in signaling the acceleration and demise of the 
capitalist accumulation episodes with recurring crises. 
This paper will convene from these two principles in its attempt to inquire into the nature and 
causes of the current collapse of the wealth of nations.  In what follows, I start with an 
investigation of the structural causes of the global crisis in the next section. Then, I offer and 
elaborate some of the key statistics on the global history of capitalism, both in its center and 
the periphery.  The paper extends with taxonomy of the crises of post-financialization and 
concludes with an overview of the lessons distilled thus far, coupled with prognostications 
into the future. 
 
ON THE STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS 
It is no doubt that an episode of expansion followed by a crisis at the global scale is not the 
first one experienced by the humans in their economic history.  We have witnessed, over the 
course of somewhat 600 years of capitalism, many such episodes involving massive 
expansion of wealth led by accumulation of capital at the global scale, yet to be followed by 
severe crises with onerous adjustments, and quite often by devastating wars.  It is important 
to note, however, that such processes of global expansion and crises had never been in the 
form of simple reproduction and cyclical recurrence.  Under each cyclical expansion – crisis 
episode there had been an element of directionality with the emancipation of broader patterns 
of expanded accumulation, technological expansion, and financial depth. 
The notions of waves of long durée were already noted by the modern Marxian framework, 
often regarded synonymous with the works of Nikolai Kondratieff. (See, e.g.,   It would 
prove illuminating at this instance to pursue the conceptualization offered by Giovanni 
Arrighi in his 1994 work The Long Twentieth Century.  Resting his theoretical framework on 
the Marxian notion of expanded production via M – C – M’ circuit, Arrighi argues that 
capitalist expansion in material accumulation can be described by investments  first in liquid 
capital, M, then to be transformed into constant capital, C.  Led by new technological 
advances, investments in new industries necessitate capital to be tied up in irreversible fixed 
investments.  It is the increasing returns of this irreversibility of C that sets the conditions for 
an upswing in profits and global expansion.  As this process deepens, however, inter-
capitalist rivalry sets in; fierce competition chokes up profit opportunities; technological 
innovations lose steam and mature; profit rates over constant capital fall.    At this instance 
old industries need to be dismantled; new rounds of liquidification become necessary.  
Capital seeks for liquidity, mobility and malleability.  This is when a new round of 
financialization is invigorated where constant capital is torn into new liquid capital, M’.  4 
 
This process of Schumpeterian creative destruction is often accompanied —and is made 
possible— by a “corrective war” and replacement of the old hegemon with a new one.  Thus, 
Arrighi maintains that the ascendancy of finance over industry is not a new stage of 
capitalism, but is a recurrent phenomenon, a phase of longer cycles of capitalist development 
that began in the late medieval and early modern Europe (Arrighi, ibid, p. xi). 
Based on this vision Arrighi outlines four systemic cycles of accumulation — maturity —
crisis, each dominated and administered under the auspices of a hegemonic state: a Genoese 
cycle (fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries); a Dutch cycle (late sixteenth to late eighteenth 
centuries); a British cycle (late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries); and a US cycle (early 
twentieth century to-date).  Yet, as noted above, none of these cycles were regular cyclical 
recurrent movements.  Arrighi argued that each new cycle was shorter; each new hegemon 
more powerful and bolder; and each new financialization was more complex.  To these we 
must add a very significant distinguishing feature of the current crisis: the current global 
crisis is the first such episode in human history in which “money” (and by extension all 
financial assets) does not have a standard unit of value, such as gold, against which its value 
can be objectively measured.  The crisis erupted under conditions where currencies have only 
“fiat” values, and financialization advanced under a “make belief” system of virtual values 
independent of a gold —or any metallic— standard. 
In short, under the current crisis episode there does not exist any anchor for the nominal 
value of money. 
This characteristic leads into a very basic problem for the capitalist world.  Under conditions 
of indeterminacy of the “true” objective value of money in the global system it becomes 
virtually impossible to determine the values of all remaining financial assets —whether 
credible or “toxic”— in the global financial markets.  Under conditions of fiat monies, 
valuation of a financial asset rests solely on expectations, a make-belief world of expected 
positive returns.  Thus, in this world terms such as “expectations management”, or “credible 
governance” come to the forefront in all attempts to pull the system out of the crisis.  
Ultimately it is due to this impossibility that the “true” costs of the crisis cannot be measured, 
and the magnitude of the rescue plans cannot be computed. 
In contrast, the financial architecture that had been designed in the aftermath of the Second 
World War in the Bretton Woods village of New Hampshire, US had succeeded in 
maintaining such a nominal anchor: the US dollar was tied to the gold standard, and all major 
currencies were tied to the US dollar via fixed rates of exchange.  What’s more an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established to oversee the prevalent exchange rates 
and to supply cheap credit (and advice!) to overcome any individual balance of payments 
problems.  Thus, under the Bretton Woods system the nominal anchor that ultimately 
determined the objective value of money was the first exchange rate system indirectly tied to 
gold under the dominance of the US dollar.  In this manner currency speculation, and thus, 
uncertainty and risk were disentangled out of the global financial system.  In the words of the 
architect, John Maynard Keynes himself, “finance has become, and ought to be, a national 
matter”. 
The post-1950 Bretton Woods system had also coincided with a relatively tolerant view 
towards wage earner incomes and a period of relative peace between capital and wage labor.  
Led and overseen by the philosophy of a social welfare state, the post-1950 period witnessed 
the emergence of embedded liberalism, where each nation state had assumed the primary task 
of fighting unemployment and provision of cheap and wide ranging public services such as 
free health and education to its citizens —yet all under the realm of the “market system”.  
The industrialization model of the period was ultimately Fordist, resting on the notion of 5 
 
“mass production for mass consumption”.  This model basically regarded wages not only as a 
cost item, but also —and perhaps more so— as an income item, giving way to more tolerant 
attitudes towards wage demands of powerful workers’ unions. 
The capitalist world has lived through the 1950-74 period with unprecedented rates of 
growth. Led by an expansionary fiscal and monetary framework in the metropols, the world 
economy expanded at a rate of 2.9% per annum over this period.  Furthermore, the poor 
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America have, for the first time in history, experienced a 
global rise in their per capita incomes.  Based mostly on these features, the 1950-74 episode 
of capitalism came to be referred to as the ‘golden age’. 
However, simultaneous to these developments the iron laws of capitalism were at work.  
Intense capital accumulation invigorated unavoidable falls in the rate of profit.  Furthermore, 
as production was carried on a massive scale based on the standard technologies of the 
Fordist assembly line, new competitors from Japan, and parts of the periphery such as Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Brazil, and Spain emerged as new centers of fierce competition.  Starting 
from mid-60s as the rate of profit start to dwindle all over the Western world, it was clearly 
plain that the end of the golden age was near.  Expansion of capital accumulation necessitated 
ever higher rates of return; and yet, capital was held relatively immobile within the national 
boundaries under the Bretton woods system. 
 
THE END OF THE “GOLDEN AGE”, RE­FINANCIALIZATION OF CAPITAL 
Recent history reveals that the inner conflicts of the Fordist production/accumulation 
fostering “mass production for mass consumption” and its financial accompaniment —the 
Bretton woods system, treating “finance as a national matter” had surfaced by early 1970s.  
The political and economic limits of the golden age were reached.  By then the capitalist 
world was in search of new means of expansion in order to overcome the threat of under 
consumption and overproduction.  Yet, it was an impasse between the requirements of 
sustaining high real incomes for the working class on the one hand, and maintaining 
profitability, on the other.  Added to this dilemma, the financial system was not able to 
diversify its portfolios under a regime of fixed exchange rates and regulated financial 
markets.  Finance capital was captivated with the dreams of full mobility as witnessed in the 
closing decades of the 19th century belle epoch. 
It was further during this period that the Western banks hoarded huge sums of petro dollars 
originating from the OPEC revenues due to oil price shocks.  A second source of piling idle 
funds was the ballooning retirement funds of the baby boom generation.  All these funds 
were in search of exquisite rates of return, which, alas, were not formidable under the strictly 
regulated Bretton Woods system.  It wasn’t long that the trumpets of “End the financial 
repression!” were to be heard from the works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) calling 
for deregulation, liberalization, and flexibility. 
Various indicators and levels of evidence had been advanced in the literature to account for 
these facts.  Orhangazi (2008), for instance, rested his theories of financialization of the US 
economy on his calculation of the profit rate in the nonfinancial corporations over the post-
War era.  As disclosed in Figure 1, Orhangazi reports a secular decline of the profit rates of 
the nonfinancial corporations starting after the second half of the 1980’s.  After an extended 
period of restructuring over the 1980’s under the supply side economics of Ronald Reagan 
and Paul Volcker, the profitability was observed to rise. 
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Source: Orhangazi, Özgür (2008) Financialization and the US Economy, Edward-Elgar Publications. 
 
Orhangazi’s findings were also resonated in Duménil and Lévy (2006, 2004a and 2004b).  In 
their analysis of capital’s profitability in US and Europe, Duménil and Lévy (2006) reported 
on the behavior of the rate of profit as measured by the ratio of net product minus total cost of 
labor to the value of the stock of physical capital. Duménil and Lévy’s data also corroborate 
with Orhangazi’s, even with a more pronounced tendency.  The post-1980 patterns of 
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 What is hidden beneath the path of aggregate profitability in Figure 2 is the ascendancy of 
finance over industry.  To fully account for the divergent patterns of finance over industrial 
profitability, Duménil and Lévy (2006) offer a more detailed analysis.  In Figures 3a and 3b, 
we are now confronted with another picture: it is actually the rise of financial returns that pull 
aggregate profitability.  As stagnation of the industrial profit rates deepen, the rise of 
financial profit opportunities compensate for such losses.  Financialization was, then, the 
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 With the collapse of the Keynesianism, the onset of neoliberal restructuring set in.  Concepts 
such as “credibility”, “governance”, “transparency” entered into the jargon of economics, as 
the term “developing economies” were replaced by “new emerging market economies”, and 
classes such as “industrial bourgeoisie” or “finance capital” were pushed aside to be replaced 
by the neutral concept, “players”. 
In the meantime, with the advent of financialization the short termist and highly volatile 
expansionary nature of hot finance was vividly present.  As Petras and Weltmeyer (2001: 17) 
reported, in the global markets during the late 1990’s, for every 1$ of transaction carried out 
in the real sector, the finance sector was observed to utilize a transaction volume reaching to 
25-30 dollars.  As the main actor of international finance, the banking sector has diversified 
its international operations rapidly and increased its international credits to the developing 
world from US$32 billion in 1972 to $90 billion in 1981 (Strange, 1994. 112). 
However, as the unregulated finance led into cycles of unsustainable bubbles, it laid down the 
anarchic nature of capitalism. As I had underscored in the introductory paragraphs of this 
essay, after 1971 human history has entered an entirely new phase of a monetary system in 
which there does not exist any objective standard of value to determine the price of money 
and other financial assets.  Since 1971 the US dollar has been off the gold standard and all 
currencies in the capitalist world are operating with fiat values.  As such, values are fiat; to be 
governed by “expectations” and by the “speculative games” performed in the financial 
casinos of capitalism.  In such a world, it is unavoidable that bubbles would be driven by the 
runs of bulls to unprecedented heights based on positive expectations, to burst into veins by 
the bears gloomy views.  Perhaps in the first time in human history capitalism was successful 
in creating monetary gains out of value without any discourse on production; that is, the 
circuit of M — M’ apparently replaced the roundabout scheme M — C — M’.  In the word of 
common folklore, the genie was out of the bubble. 
Figure 4 illustrates these points succinctly.  Adapted from Duménil and Lévy (2006 and 
2004a) the Figure traces the net worth of financial corporations in the US in comparison to 
that of the nonfinancial corporations.  Mid-1980’s are again revealed as a turning point where 



















The term “globalization” stands out as the hegemonic concept of the neoliberal ideology, 
reflecting one of the main items in the current political economy agenda. This buzz-word 
seems to have a spiritual power in its own right as it provides a center-force directing our 
daily discourse on economic, social, political, and cultural relations. 
The concept is mostly revealed as part of a modern project on “citizenship” along with 
references to such slogans as: “being a citizen of the globalized village” and “adjusting to the 
needs of the global markets”. In this sense, the term itself carries a dual conceptual meaning: 
a definition, and a policy recipe.  As a definition, the term refers to the increased integration 
of the world’s commodity and finance markets and its cultural and social values. Within the 
context of this definition, liberalization of the commodity trade and financial flows yield the 
narrowest economic implications of the globalization process. At a more general level, this 
process entails“… a programme for destroying collective structures which may impede the 
pure market logic” (Bourdieu, 1998).  In order to sanctify the power of the markets in the 
name of economic efficiency, this “infernal machine” requires the elimination of 
administrative or political barriers which limit the owners of capital in their quest for 
maximization of individual profit, which, in turn has been upheld as the supreme indicator of 
rationality” (ibid).   
Thus, the concept also covers a list of economic-political- and social actions that is regarded 
necessary for a country to “embrace” globalization.  Brought under the term “Washington 
Consensus”, these conditionalities are often imposed as part of the austerity programmes 
designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Accordingly, in a market economy under capitalist competition, the profit rate (or, more 
generally, the rate of return to capital) is heralded as the supreme objective and the state 
apparatus is to be re-organized to ensure highest profitability of capital.  This re-organization 
aims at reducing the role of the public sector in regulation of the economy, and is dressed 
with the rhetoric of terms such as “governance” and “market-friendly, credible governments”. 
The main dictum of the globalization rhetoric rests its arguments on the allegation that 
“globalization is the natural product of human history and as such it is unavoidable”.  Thus, 
all countries should follow the necessary policies (often termed as structural reforms) to take 
advantage of this magical process. Only then the bounties of globalization would follow to 
those countries that succeeded implementation of such reforms.  Given this logic, the main 
responsibility of the developing countries is to open their economies to international capital 
and to implement the necessary reforms warranted by the transnational companies (TNCs) 
and international financial institutions (the so-called IFIs).  
Thus, we can deduce three interlinked aspects of global capitalism in the current juncture:  
neoliberal restructuring, neoliberal globalization, and financialization.  Neoliberal 
restructuring had been propagated with the counter attacks of monetarism and supply side 
economics in the hands of Ronald Reagan in the USA, Kohl in Germany, Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK, and Özal in Turkey.  The assault reached its zenith in the 1990’s with the rhetoric 
of “the end of history” when all questions were declared to be answered, all unknowns were 
behind, and the world was on a sustained path towards global bliss. 
With the rise of globalization, mobility of capital was enhanced on a world scale.  It is 
estimated that China’s and India’s opening up to the global markets and the collapse of the 
Soviet system together have added 1.5 billion new workers to the world’s economically 
active population (Freeman, 2004; Akyuz, 2008).  This means almost a doubling of the global 
labor force and a reduction of the global capital-labor ratio by half.  Concomitant with the emergence of the developing countries in the global manufacturing trade, about 90% of the 
labor employed in world merchandise trade is low-skilled and un-skilled, suffering from 
marginalization and all too frequent violation of basic worker rights in informalized markets 
(see, e.g., Akyuz, 2008 and 2003, Akyuz, Flassback and Kozul-Wright (2006)).  
Under these conditions, a large number of developing countries have suffered de-
industrialization, serious informalization, and consequent worsening of the position of wage-
labor, resulting in a deterioration of income distribution and increased poverty.  Many of 
these phenomena have occurred in tandem with the onset of neoliberal conditionalities 
imposing rapid liberalization of trade and premature deregulation of the indigenous financial 
markets.  Thus, across all economies, industrialized or peripheral, wage incomes collapsed; 
income share of wage labor in aggregate domestic product fell, and the appropriated 
surpluses fed the rising corporate profits. Financialization further meant the inflation of this 
bubble into make-belief values. 
The assault of capital on wage labor incomes had been a common observation in all 
economies of the globe.  But it was perhaps the most viable aspect of the US economy.  
Historically the United States was always been recognized as an economy with strong middle 
classes, thanks to the strength of its wage incomes.  Yet, all of that had abruptly changed 
under neoliberal restructuring.  Witness, for instance, the data portrayed in Figure 5.  Adapted 
from data of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) and calculations offered by Wolf and 
Resnick (2006), Figure 5 narrates the evolution of weekly wage rates in the US economy as 
ten-year averages since 1820. 
Data portrayed in Figure 5 is astonishing. After a sustained secular rise in real wages for 150 
years, US labor had, for the first time in its history, confronted a contraction in its 
remunerations.  US labor had maintained positive wage increases even under conditions of 
the Great Depression of the 1930’s, or under the turbulent days of the age of the revolution —
the 1950’s.  The collapse of labor incomes under neoliberal restructuring had been carried on 






















Source: Resnick, S. A. And R. D. Wolf (2006) "Exploitation, Consumption and the Uniqueness of US 
Capitalism" in New Departures in Marxian Theory, Routledge. 
 
Yet, the burning question ultimately resurfaces: as incomes of labor were to contract at such a 
scale, how would it be possible to ensure sufficient demand for the products produced?  
Given the logic of capitalism, wage labor is as much of a component of final demand, as it is 
also a cost item.  Thus, pursuit of even higher profits by way of squeezing surplus out of 
suppressed wage costs necessarily led to periods of insufficiency of demand, culminating 
eventually into falling gross revenues.  This dilemma of insufficiency of demand and 
overproduction is a direct manifestation of the anarchic character of capitalism. 
It was at this juncture that the introduction of debt instruments under the post-1980 
financialization had enabled the middle classes to sustain their positions as a component of 
final demand.  During a period of falling current incomes, newly created debt instruments 
with various options of indebtedness helped the American —and elsewhere— working class 
to be part of the consumerist culture.  As private savings fell to negative ratios to the gross 
domestic product, household debts accumulated rapidly.  Financialization, thus, was not an 
opportune moment only for the capitalists as a class in compensating the loss of industrial 
profitability, but it also meant expanded consumption power for the working class which 
otherwise experienced significant income losses. 
In order to study the structural imbalances of this new episode, we have to note that 
financialization in fact refers to a process wherein previously created values are re-valued.  In 
other words, financial activities do not create new values, but admit a revaluation of the 
values created elsewhere in the real sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, or construction.  It 
is no doubt that this revaluation process creates positive financial profits; but such profits do 
not correspond in any manner to newly created values in the material world.  It is this re-
evaluation that is meant by financial bubbles. 
This bonanza continued as long as this façade of paper towers could have been sustained.  It 
was finally the 2007/2008 crash in the US housing market that ignited its collapse.
1  To 
appreciate the forces at work, let’s recall the knife-edge properties of the world’s production 
and trade flows as of 2006.  In Table 1 the global economy is partitioned into three regions: 
North America supplies $12.4 trillion of the world’s aggregate gross domestic product (35%) 
and meets $1.2 trillion of total exports (roughly 15%).  European economies generate 31.6% 
of gross world product and 45.7% of the global trade.  The new “tigers” of capitalism, South 
and East Asia, produce 20.2% of aggregate world income and sustain 24% of its trade. 
 
1 Most accounts refer to the collapse of the Lehman Broethers in 15 September 2008 as the major twist of the 
global crisis; but in our view the initiating was way back in 9 August 2007 when the French Bank BNA refused 




As Ratio to the World 
Aggregate (%)
Total Exports  
(Trillion $)
As Ratio to the 
World Aggregate 
(%)
North America 12.4 34.1 (%) 1.2 15.9 (%)
Europe 11.5 31.6 (%) 3.3 45.7 (%)
South and East Asia 7.4 20.2 (%) 1.8 23.9 (%)
Source: Dicken, Peter (2007) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy, The Fifth 
Ed. New York: Guilford Press.  
 
The detail hidden in the data displayed in table 1 is this: as of 2006 the north American 
region, while producing a third of the global product, had $188 billion worth of exports to 
Europe, and imports $317 billion from it.  Exports from North America to South and East 
Asia amounted to $219 billion, while its imports were $428 billion.  These numbers meant, 
for the USA and Canada combined a trade deficit of $129 billion with Europe, and $209 
billion with Asia.  As the North America sponged these cheap imports to its domestic market, 
it also succeeded in maintaining lower wages and inflows of cheap intermediate goods for its 
producers.  What the North Americans had to offer in return was loads of “new instruments” 
of finance and a “fiat” currency. 
As America was transformed into a finance and services economy, production of 
manufactures has shifted to the factories of the world to be marketed at the export processing 
zones of Asia and maquiladoras of Latin America.  Products manufactured in these 
peripheral regions, on the other hand, were exchanged with “papers” created in the casino 
tables of the Wall Street.  However, the valuation of these papers ultimately rested on 
speculative expectations and imaginary beliefs of fictitious values.  The 2007/2008 events 
meant the collapse of this make-belief fable, while concepts such as “toxic assets” and 
“subprime credits” emerged as the characteristic descriptions of this era. 
 
TWO GENERATIONS OF CRISES UNDER THE AGE OF FINANCIALIZATION 
Mainstream economists usually tabulate the individual country crisis episodes in terms of 
generations, based on certain commonalities.  To follow suit, I will propose that since the 
emancipation of financialization of global capitalism over roughly the last quarter of the 20
th 
century, we had witnessed broadly two generations of financial crises.  The first of these had 
typically erupted in the emerging market economies of Mexico 1994, Turkey 1994, and then 
again 2001, Brazil 1998, Argentina 2001, and of course, the Asian flu of 1997. Almost all of 
these were explained, one way another, by a form of moral hazard —lack of “prudential” 
regulation, and biased incentives emanating from the expectation that the risk-takers are too 
large to fail.   
12 
 
Thus, under this first generation crises of financialization crises erupted mainly due to 
premature financial liberalization; lack of governance; lack of the rule of law; etc.  Typically 
countries which had been lured into the calls of the trumpets of “end the financial repression; 
hail to the free financial markets” (a la McKinnon, 1973 and Shaw, 1973), liberalized their 
financial sector too prematurely, and too hastily without any respect to their macroeconomic 
fundamentals. In these economies the aftermath of capital account deregulation often led to 
increased interest rates.  Based on the motive to combat the “fear of capital flight”, this commitment stimulated further foreign inflows, and the domestic currency appreciated 
inviting an even higher level of short term capital and hot money inflows into the often 
shallow domestic financial markets.  Under these conditions the initial bonanza of debt-
financed public (e.g. Turkey) or private (e.g. Mexico, Korea) spending escalates rapidly and 
severs the fragility of the shallow financial markets in the home country.  Eventually the 
bubble bursts and a series of severe and onerous macro adjustments are enacted through very 
high real interest rates, sizable devaluations, and a harsh entrenchment of aggregate demand 
accompanied by the short term “hot money” outflows.  Elements of this vicious cycle are 
further studied in Adelman and Yeldan (2000), Calvo and Vegh (1999), Dornbusch, Goldfajn 
and Valdés (1995), Diaz-Alejandro (1985), and more recently referred to as the Diaz-
Alejandro-Taylor cycle in Köse, Şenses and Yeldan (2008) (following Diaz-Alejandro (1985) 
and Taylor (1998)).  A schema of such events is portrayed in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals led by 
Diaz Alejandro -Taylor cycle capital inflows: The
Rise in the domestic interest rate:
Stimulate capital inflows
Domestic currency appreciates
Imports expand, current account
deficit widens
To finance the foreign deficit, invite 
raise the  even more capital inflows,
interest rate
 
The characteristics of the first generation variety of crises typically involve the following: (i) 
International capital market has been the major source of shocks; (ii) Flows have largely 
originated from and been received by the private sector; (iii) The financial crises have mostly 
hit emerging market economies that were considered to be highly credible and successful; 
(iv) The rise of capital inflows has been characterized by a lack of regulation, on both the 
supply and the demand sides.  
Not much of a hint can be distilled from the above to prognosticate further for the current 
global crisis.  The current crisis has clearly gone beyond the narrow geographies of the Third 
World of the emerging markets, and its origins lie not at the roots of standard moral hazard 
anecdotes, but go deep to the very structure of the global financial system.  Even though the 
spheres of production, trade and finance are obviously inter-connected, the origins of today’s 
financial crisis are not rooted in the falling rates of profitability as was the case with the crisis 
of late 1970’s, nor in the patterns of trade that emerged since then.  It is an amalgam of all 




To highlight the significance of both the depth and the complexity of the current crisis 
episode, I will phrase the term, “second generation crises of financialization”.  In addition to 
many aspects that were be highlighted in the above pages of this paper, one key difference in 14 
 
the modes of adjustment is clear: the first generation crises mostly reflected the excessive risk 
taking behavior based on moral hazard opportunities and led to a spectacular collapse of the 
financial markets with a heavy dose of currency depreciation, skyrocketing interest rates, and 
an abrupt contraction of output.  The swings of the crisis were deep but narrow, the 
contractions were steep and yet their duration was relatively short. What we observe over the 
phase of the current second generation crisis, however, is that its impact is prolonged and 
slow; rather than a spectacle fall, we experience a long retrenchment; adjustments are slow in 
coming.  To depict these course of events, many analysts point to the analogy that the mode 
of adjustments will likely entail a “U” type of a turn, rather than a quick “V”, while many 
others extend the analogy to an “L” type of a prolonged stagnation, with adjustments yet to 
e seen…  b
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS: WHAT IS NEXT FOR CAPITALISM? 
What does await for the capitalist world following the current global crisis?  Within a broader 
perspective one might conjecture two possible trajectories.  First, given the global collapse of 
the financial value system, reconstruction of the trade patterns might be forced through 
coercion.  The economic surplus that has been created constantly in the cheap labor abundant 
workshops of South and East Asia ought to be burned up.  If the market sale of this surplus in 
exchange of the now intoxicated financial papers eventually fails, then their ‘consumption’ 
will necessarily call for non-economic coercive measures within a possible war.  At such 
conjunctures of the previous financialization episodes of capitalism, cycles of under-
consumption/over-production had been “resolved” by way of a globally devastating war.  The 
Marxian literature on crises, prominently Rosa Luxemburg, points out to the necessity of a 
‘corrective war’ in order to break with the “old” institutions, “old” technologies, and “old” 
methods of accumulation.  In our current context, the local wars that erupted in late 1990’s in 
the Balkans and continued with the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric in Iraq and Afghanistan, possibly 
extending over Iran and Pakistan are cited as signals to such corrective wars. 
A second possible shift out of the current crisis might also involve a global restructuring of 
not only the production centers, but also the financial/administrative centers of global 
capitalism to new geographies.  This entails a process that one might call the emergence of 
third world capitalism.  Yet, given the characteristics that such a shift signal thus far, the 
third world capitalism entails aggressive exploitation of not only of labor, but also of the 
natural resources and environmental richness’s of our planet.  The environmental threats and 
human costs of such a violent assault of capitalism will prove devastating and horrendous.  
Furthermore, such a restructuring shift of the centers of global capitalism will probably not be 
a smooth transition and will most likely trigger counter-offensive measures by the current 
hegemonic powers —the US, UK and Europe. 
Whatever the options, one can envisage within capitalism, a realistic re-evaluation of the 
possible scenarios seem to exhaust all calls for optimism.  One cannot help to recall Rosa 
Luxemburg’s cry from almost 100 years earlier: “either barbarism, or socialism”. 
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